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SHATTERING THE MYTH OF MUNICIPAL
IMPOTENCE: THE AUTHORITY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO CREATE
AFFORDABLE HOUSING*
John R. Nolon**
I. Introduction
The lack of affordable housing is the focus of the debate over bal-
anced growth in most developing communities.' A recent report is-
sued by the New York State Governor's Housing Task Force put it
succinctly: "[t]he people of New York State face a housing crisis."2
This lack of affordable housing not only frustrates the underlying pur-
pose of local land use authority,3 but also amounts to a failure to ac-
* The author would like to acknowledge the creative work of the elected officials,
planners and municipal attorneys in the New York communities of Bedford, Briarcliff,
Dobbs Ferry, Eastchester, Goshen, Greenburgh, Harrison, Ithaca, Lewisboro,
Mamaroneck, North East, Orangetown, Ossining, Pawling, Poughkeepsie, Tarrytown,
and Yorktown. These communities are venturing onto new legal terrain to induce and
regulate the private providers of housing so that housing may be produced at prices half
as expensive as those produced by the unaided private market. This is particularly
remarkable considering the fact that these localities are working in a public policy void
created by the failure of the state to create standards and guidelines for municipal action.
** Professor of Law, Pace Law School. J.D., University of Michigan Law School.
Mr. Nolon is a member of the Section of Urban, State and Local Government Law of the
American Bar Association and has served as an advisor to the U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development and to the President's Council on Development Choices in
the 1980s.
1. See infra notes 4, 11 and accompanying text.
2. HOUSING IN NEW YORK, BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: REPORT OF THE Gov-
ERNOR'S HOUSING TASK FORCE (1988). The report continues:
[i]t is a crisis that affects the lives of virtually every citizen of the State, and
seriously threatens New York's long-term economic health .... The dream of
owning one's own home is no longer within reach for more than half of all New
Yorkers. Many young adults, unable to afford even the down payment on a
new home, must either continue to live with their parents or move out of the
communities where they were raised. Even those who are fortunate enough to
have a decent place to live must often pay dearly for the privilege, frequently
spending a disproportionate amount of their incomes on basic housing.
Id. at 7.
Interestingly, although the supply of new housing is controlled, in substantial part, by
the land use decisions of local governments, the recommendations of the Task Force do
not suggest that the state alter or even reconsider the plenary delegation of its land use
authority to such governments.
3. All the enabling statutes cited infra note 7 base their grant of power to local
government on similar language. See, e.g., N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-700 (McKinney
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complish several of the fundamental objectives of community
planning. 4
There is a close relationship between the public welfare and an ade-
quate stock of affordable housing. Without affordable housing, the
balanced work force needed to attract and retain commercial and in-
dustrial development will not exist. Without business development,
the community will not enjoy the benefits of a diversified tax base. A
diversified tax base eases the pressures on residential taxpayers, cre-
ates stability for the municipal corporation, and helps the community
weather economic changes. The development of affordable housing
for the young and old, for people of low and middle income, breathes
fairness into the development pattern of a locality, and provides living
accommodations for all segments of the population. This diversified
housing stock creates a heterogeneous population and economy and
an equitable distribution of housing opportunity, thereby furthering
the objectives of comprehensive planning.
The authority to control the development of a diversified housing
stock in New York State rests firmly in the hands of local govern-
ments.' Although the state legislature may rescind or modify this au-
thority, it has rarely exercised this right, preferring to leave control
over land use with local governments.6
1987) ("[fjor the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare
of the community . . ").
4. All of the enabling statutes discussed infra note 7 mandate that zoning regulations
(which determine how much land will be devoted to residential uses and at what densi-
ties) be in accordance with a comprehensive or well-considered plan. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN.
CITY LAW § 20 (25) (McKinney 1968) ("[s]uch regulations shall be... in accord with a
well considered plan"). State law in New York, as contrasted to that of about 20 other
states, does not mandate the adoption of a formal comprehensive plan, nor does it define
what the elements of such a plan are. The authority to adopt such plans in New York is
permissive, and therefore, there are no standard objectives found in every local compre-
hensive plan.
Many local plans contain language calling for the maintenance of a socio-economic
balance, a diversified demographic base, and an adequate work force. These objectives
will be frustrated without a diversity of housing opportunity in the community. For this
reason, some plans include achieving such diversity in housing as a separate objective.
5. See infra note 6; see also Barker v. Switzer, 209 A.D. 151, 153, 205 N.Y.S. 108,
109 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 238 N.Y. 624, 144 N.E. 918 (1924); see also Adler v.
Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929) (Cardozo, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 252
N.Y. 574, 170 N.E. 148 (1929). "A zoning resolution in many of its features is distinc-
tively a city affair, a concern of the locality, affecting, as it does, the density of population,
the growth of city life, and the course of city values." 251 N.Y. at 485, 167 N.E. at 711.
6. This insulation of local authority from state attack is bolstered by the inclusion of
the local power to zone in the Statute of Local Governments. The Statute of Local Gov-
ernments provides in § 10, subdivision 6: "a city, village, or town ... [has] the power to
adopt, amend and repeal zoning regulations." N.Y. STAT. LOCAL Gov'TS § 10 (Consol.
1984). To modify this delegation of authority, the state legislature must enact such an
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State statutes delegate land use control and zoning power, includ-
ing the power to divide the municipality into districts, and, within
those districts, to regulate the use of buildings and land.' The re-
gional mix of houses, offices, stores, parks and factories results from
the actions of the several constituent localities. Development patterns
in metropolitan areas, therefore, are dictated by the land use decisions
of the many local governments within those areas. This may explain
why debates over land use imbalances tend to occur more often in the
local forum than in the halls of the state legislature.
The local authority to regulate land use, however, has not gone un-
challenged. Over the last fifteen years, there have been several attacks
on local zoning ordinances alleged to exclude, unconstitutionally,
large segments of the region's population.' The courts in these cases
have generally limited the scope of their inquiry to whether the chal-
lenged ordinance, in restricting certain types of housing, excludes cer-
tain groups of people.9
Although the New York courts deciding exclusionary cases have
not required affirmative action to meet regional housing needs,'" they
amendment at regular sessions in two calendar years, with the approval of the Governor.
Thus, the state retains a veto over a nominally autonomous local land use authority.
Only rarely, however, does the state legislature actually usurp local land use authority.
7. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 262 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20
(2) (McKinney 1968); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 7-702 (McKinney 1987). These provisions,
nearly parallel in nature, authorize the three levels of local government to determine the
mix of commercial, industrial, institutional, recreational, residential and other types of
land' uses within each particular locality. The Town Law provision, for example, states
"the town board may divide.., the town.., into districts... and within such districts it
may regulate and restrict ... the ... use of buildings, structures or land." N.Y. TOWN
LAW § 262 (McKinney 1987).
8. See, e.g., Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d .236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 511
N.E.2d 67, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987); Asian Am. for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y.2d 121,
527 N.E.2d 265, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1988); Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper
Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert, denied, 450
U.S. 1042 (1981); 208 E. 30th St. Corp. v. North Salem, 89 A.D.2d 851, 488 N.Y.S.2d
723 (2d Dep't 1982).
9. Types of housing, such as multi-family housing or mobile homes that are gener-
ally regarded as affordable, are often called "uses" in zoning parlance. "Exclusionary
zoning may occur ... because the municipality has limited the permissible uses within a
community to exclude certain groups .... " Asian Ams. for Equality, 72 N.Y.2d at 133,
527 N.E.2d at 271, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 788. The courts have not gone further to require
localities to exercise their full authority to actually create affordable housing opportuni-
ties from the diverse housing types permitted in their zoning ordinances. See infra note
10 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 8. In contrast, New Jersey courts have affirmatively mandated
that localities create affordable housing. In 1983, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
the seminal case of Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 158, 336 A.2d 713, 731-32 (1975). Addressing the issue of whether municipali-
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have radically changed the perception of whose health, safety and
welfare should be advanced by the exercise of local land use authority.
Where past opinions reflected the notion that a community's zoning
should be introspective in nature, it is now settled law that local zon-
ing decisions must be made with regional needs in mind." The New
York Legislature has not responded to judicial pleas for its interven-
tion in these matters,'" nor has the legislature acted to define local
responsibility for regional housing needs. 13
In the absence of any guidance from the legislature, local officials,
in confronting the problem of affordable housing, look to the courts to
ties had to exercise their police power to create affordable housing, the court held in a
previous decision that "a developing municipality . . . must, by its land use regulations,
make realistically possible the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of hous-
ing for all categories of people who may desire to live there," including low-and moder-
ate-income residents. Id. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-32 (emphasis added). See generally
Fox, The Selling Out of Mount Laurel: Regional Contribution Agreements in New
Jersey's Fair Housing Act, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 535 (1988).
The New York courts have held only that they will "assess the reasonableness of what
the locality has done," in light of present and foreseeable local and regional housing
needs. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682. Thus while
the courts have made it clear that a municipality has an obligation to consider the hous-
ing needs of low-income families, only New Jersey has required affirmative action to meet
those needs. See Nolon, A Comparative Analysis of New Jersey's Mount Laurel Cases
With the Berenson Cases in New York, 4 PACE ENV. L. REV. 3 (1986).
11. "[In enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration must be given to regional needs
and requirements .... Although we are aware of the traditional view that zoning acts
only upon the property lying within the zoning board's territorial limits, it must be recog-
nized that zoning often has a substantial impact beyond the boundaries of the municipal-
ity. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
12. "Zoning ...is essentially a legislative act. Thus, it is quite anomalous that a
court should be required to perform the tasks of a regional planner. To that end, we look
to the [1legislature to make appropriate changes in order to foster the development of
programs designed to achieve sound regional planning." Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341
N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682; see also Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo,
30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972).
Of course, these problems (of growth) cannot be solved by Ramapo or any sin-
gle municipality, but depend upon the accommodation of widely disparate in-
terests for their ultimate resolution. To that end, [s]tate-wide or regional
control of planning would insure that interests broader than that of the munici-
pality underlie various land use policies.
Id. at 376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
13. The state legislature has taken some action to provide a few sources of funding for
housing for special population groups, to be developed, by and large, by non-profit devel-
opers. However, it has failed to provide guidance to its municipal agents as to the extent
of their duty to act. See HOUSING PROGRAMS OF NEW YORK STATE: REPORT OF THE
DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL, THE HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY,
THE MORTGAGE LOAN ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION CORPORATION, THE STATE
OF NEW YORK MORTGAGE AGENCY (Mario M. Cuomo, Governor, 1987) (available at
Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
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define the extent of their responsibility and power. While not provid-
ing specific direction, the New York Court of Appeals has clearly out-
lawed zoning designed to exclude affordable housing. 4 The judiciary
has voiced doubts, however, that municipal governments can,
through zoning alone, require the development of affordable hous-
ing.'5 The view that municipalities lack such power is erroneous.
Zoning alone is competent to induce such development.' 6 Further-
more, local governments have considerable additional power to in-
duce the creation of such housing. This Article will document this
competence and authority of municipal governments to induce the
development of affordable housing.
Part II analyzes in detail the use of the traditional zoning powers of
local governments to create affordable housing, and examines tech-
niques such as conditional rezoning, floating zones, special permits
and the application of a relatively new concept called "density zon-
ing" or "incentive zoning." Part II also considers whether municipal-
ities may meet "local" needs by granting occupancy preferences under
such zoning schemes. In addition, this Part examines restrictions on
the transfer of title to affordable housing in order to perpetuate that
affordability, as well as common law rules such as the rule against
perpetuities and the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation.
Part III looks at the untapped wealth of statutory authority that
14. See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 511 N.E.2d 67,
517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987).
Implicit in our rulings is a recognition of the principle that a municipality may
not legitimately exercise its zoning power to effectuate socioeconomic or racial
discrimination .... Although we affirm the disposition of the Appellate Divi-
sion here, we note that today's decision (should not) be read as revealing hostil-
ity to breaking down even unconstitutional zoning barriers that frustrate the
deep human yearning of low-income and minority groups for decent housing
they can afford in decent surroundings.
Id. at 131, 511 N.E.2d at 71, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
15. Such doubts are illustrated in language contained in a 1983 Second Department
decision sustaining a local zoning ordinance against an attack by a developer plaintiff.
Blitz v. Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1983).
[Z]oning ordinances will go no further than determining what may or may not
be built ... in the absence of government subsidies. Thus in terms of low-to-
moderate income rental housing-generally conceded to be the most pressing
need . . .- even the most liberal zoning ordinance, in the absence of affirmative
governmental action to shift the balance of market forces, will have no success
in promoting such housing construction.
Id. at 99, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 836. This further illustrates the view of the New York courts
that the role of the local government is simply to zone for certain types of housing, such
as multifamily, and that higher levels of government must provide subsidies if housing
affordable for households of modest means is to be produced by the private sector.
16. See infra notes 18-84 and accompanying text.
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enables local governments to further reduce the cost of housing.'"
Statutes provide the authority to facilitate affordable housing by
granting property tax abatements, acquiring land by eminent domain,
selling public land at favorable prices, issuing bonds to provide inex-
pensive permanent loans for affordable housing, and building support-
ive infrastructure, such as sidewalks, streets and sewers.
Part IV concludes that an understanding of the plenary nature of
this, local authority can change the perceptions of the state courts in
designing remedies for exclusionary zoning and that the state legisla-
ture can act more effectively to guide, encourage and direct local gov-
ernments in exercising the authority delegated to them.
II. Using Zoning Affirmatively to Create Affordable Housing
The misconception of the New York courts, that amendments to
local zoning ordinances alone are not competent to produce housing
affordable to moderate and low income households, was disproved
several years ago in New Jersey. There, within three years of the
Mount Laurel decision,18 local governments, reacting to the affirma-
tive mandate of their highest court, rezoned sufficient land at higher
densities to produce 1, 754 units of low and moderate income hous-
ing, amounting to thirty percent more units than fifty years of federal
subsidy programs had provided.' 9
When land is rezoned to permit higher density for residential uses,
developers realize more profit on their developments."0 Such rezoning
is often conditioned on the agreement of a developer to offer a per-
centage, generally twenty percent, of the completed houses to house-
holds of moderate means at lower prices.2' The increased profit
realized on the additional market-rate units can be used to lower the
cost of the affordable homes.
Other things being equal, the per-unit cost of residential construc-
17. Beginning at infra note 110, the reader will note a relative paucity of citations to
cases involving this statutory authority or to scholarly articles discussing them.
Although these statutes would be significantly useful in providing affordable housing,
their use at the local level has been infrequent.
18. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158,
456 A.2d 390 (1983); see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. See D. KINSEY, AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN CENTRAL NEW JERSEY: THE CON-
SEQUENCES OF MOUNT LAUREL II (Report prepared by Kinsey & Hand, Princeton, N.J.
for Middlesex Somerset Mercer Regional Council, Inc., Princeton, N.J., April 30, 1986)
(available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office); see supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
20. Bonus densities are awarded to developers to internally subsidize the lower cost
units.
21. See BEDFORD, N.Y. ch. 125, § 125-29.2(B).
388 [Vol. XVII
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tion varies directly with the density at which land may be devel-
oped-greater density means reduced land costs per unit, increased
numbers of units, and hence higher profits to the developer.
Although affordable housing does not automatically result from these
increases in development densities, the use of increased density along
with clustering and attached housing can provide a municipality with
an opportunity to induce affordable housing.
22
Zoning ordinances can be amended in several different ways to ex-
22. AFFORDABLE HOUSING ISSUES, REPORT OF THE WESTCHESTER COUNTY PLAN-
NING BOARD (1987) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
The key to producing housing for moderate income households lies in carefully
controlled rezoning that allows greater density on the land and encourages
more cost-effective types of housing to be built .... The chart that follows
shows how the price of housing may be reduced by increasing the density of
development and reducing the size of the house. Note how these changes re-
duce the price of the house and make it available to more households with lower
incomes.
Id. at 2. This concept is demonstrated in the Westchester report by the following chart,
which illustrates the potential cost reduction associated with greater density:
Typical Subdivisions and Cost Components
Related to Size of Development
Ten Units Twenty Units Thirty Units
per per per
Description unit extended unit extended unit extended
Raw Land $15,000 $150,000 $ 7,500 $ 150,000 $ 5,000 $ 150,000
Site Improvement 9,000 90,000 9,000 180,000 9,000 270,000
Hard Construction 34,000 340,000 34,000 680,000 34,000 1,020,000
Finance Cost 4,500 45,000 4,500 90,000 4,500 135,000
Sales Marketing Cost 3,500 35,000 3,500 70,000 3,500 105,000
Overhead/Administra-
tion 15,000 150,000 7,500 150,000 5,000 150,000
Miscellaneous Cost 4,050 40,000 3,300 66,000 3,050 91,500
Totals $85,050 $850,050 $69,300 $1,386,000 $64,050 $1,921,500
Profit @15 percent $12,757 $127,575 $10,395 $ 207,900 $ 9,609 $ 288,225
Per unit sales price $97,807 - $79,695 - $73,657 -
The private sector is ready to deliver. Our arithmetic shows, that given the
proper incentives, we can build affordable housing right now. We cannot wait
for the government to do what is the responsibility of the business community
at large. We must adopt legislation to provide the appropriate economic incen-
tives which will galvanize our builders. If this is done, I guarantee you there
will no longer be a shortage of affordable housing here. Furthermore, it will
mean greater and more solid economic health for Long Island.
Reprinted from AFFORDABLE HOUSING FOR LONG ISLAND, CONSTRAINTS AND SOLU-
TIONS 12 tbl.3 (Oct. 10, 1985) (conference proceedings); BUCKHURST, FISH, HUTTON,
KATZ AND URBANOMICS, ORANGE COUNTY, NEW YORK, HOUSING NEEDS STUDY 81-
85 (1986) (both available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
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change higher density for the production of affordable housing. A spe-
cific parcel may be rezoned to a higher density, conditioned on the
production of a stated percentage of units priced for moderate income
families.23 More generic programs such as special permits or floating
zones for affordable housing can be created.24 These initiatives,
although limited to specified districts or to parcels of land of certain
sizes and types, articulate a municipal policy of encouraging afforda-
ble housing. The private market may respond to that policy, sensing
that project approval may be more likely, or that profitability may be
enhanced.
Of course, local governments must regulate the housing produced
by such devices to insure that it is indeed affordable, addresses defined
needs, and remains affordable over time. In taking action to ensure
such results, a municipality must move carefully to avoid the legal
constraints on local land use actions. These legal constraints include
limitations on the delegated authority to zone, prohibitions against
spot and contract zoning,25 the rule against unreasonable restraints on
the alienation of real property and the rule against perpetuities. Ac-
cordingly, after first setting out the available zoning techniques, this
Part of the Article will examine these constraints and show that if
properly managed, they present no bar to zoning by a municipality in
order to create affordable housing.
A. Conditional Rezoning of Individual Parcels
Typically, municipalities employ conditional zoning of individual
parcels to control development when an applicant proposes the rezon-
ing of property at a greater density than currently allowed. Condi-
tions are imposed to enable the municipality to control the increased
density and its impact on the public. For example, conditions may be
23. The technique of conditional rezoning typically is applied on a case-by-case basis.
It is generally less effective than a comprehensive program of awarding density bonuses
because fewer affordable housing projects are stimulated by such an ad hoc approach.
Nevertheless, the New Jersey courts have made a state-wide affordable housing program
out of the conditional rezoning method by using it as the judicially prescribed remedy for
curing exclusionary zoning ordinances. See supra note 9.
24. See infra notes 32-56 and accompanying text.
25. See R. ANDERSON, NEW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.15, at 415 (3d
ed. 1984) [hereinafter R. ANDERSON]. Anderson defines contract and spot zoning as
follows: "[i]t is clear that if 'contract zoning' means a contract whereby a municipality
bargains away its zoning power, such zoning is unlawful .... [Local] legislatures are
without authority to exercise [zoning authority] through a contract with a landowner.
But the New York courts rarely have detected "contract zoning" in this sense, in the
cases where zoning ordinances have been attacked on this ground." Id. The term "spot
zoning" is used by the courts to describe a zoning amendment which is invalid because it
is not in accordance with a comprehensive or well-considered plan. Id. § 5.04 at 164.
[Vol. XVII
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employed to protect the character of the neighborhood26 or to achieve
a balanced population as articulated in the community's master
plan.27
The courts have accepted conditional zoning on the theory that the
authority to rezone to a greater density encompasses the authority to
allow a more limited or restricted development through the imposi-
tion of conditions.2" The standards used to determine the validity of
conditional zoning are the same as those standards applied when test-
ing the validity of any zoning ordinance:29 both the zoning ordinance
and the imposed conditions must be within the police power of the
municipality, and the municipality must pass the ordinance and im-
pose the conditions in order to promote the health, safety, and general
welfare of its citizens.30 It follows that a court reviewing a conditional
zoning amendment will consider not only the reasonableness of the
zoning change, but also the effect on adjacent properties, the effect on
the community and region, the benefit to the public, the reasonable-
ness of the conditions, and whether the change conforms to the com-
prehensive plan.3'
26. The town of Islip rezoned one parcel of land located in a residential district to
allow the property to be used as a business. The town imposed conditions on the rezon-
ing, which required the owner to execute restrictive covenants limiting the maximum
building area and requiring the maintenance of shrubbery and a fence. Church v. Town
of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
27. For a discussion of master or comprehensive plans, see supra note 4 and accompa-
nying text.
When a developer proposes that the density of a parcel in a residential district be in-
creased, the normal result in a high cost housing market area will be the production of
additional expensive homes. Although the density increase will tend somewhat to limit
the cost of the resultant houses, market conditions will keep the prices high unless some-
how controlled by the rezoning resolution. The resulting pattern of development runs
counter to comprehensive planning objectives which call for a balanced demography and
its attendant virtues. When the local government, which could deny the requested rezon-
ing, conditions the rezoning on the provision of some affordable housing for the specific
purpose of furthering the comprehensive plan, the constitutionally required "nexus" be-
tween the condition imposed and the burden created by the development is found. For a
discussion of the nexus theory, see, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483 U.S.
825 (1987).
28. See Collard v. Flower Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 421 N.E.2d 818, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326
(1981); D'Angelo v. DeBernardo, 106 Misc. 2d 755, 455 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1980).
29. Collard, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 421 N.E.2d 818, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1981).
30. See Point Lookout Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 22 Misc. 2d 757, 200
N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, II A.D.2d 731, 205 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d Dep't 1960),
aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 961, 176 N.E.2d 203, 217 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1961); see also Udell v. Haas, 21
N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
31. For example, the conditional zoning ordinance at issue in Church v. Town of Islip
was held to be reasonable because it comported with the town's master plan and was
consistent with the surrounding commercial growth. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203
N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960). Furthermore, the court found that the conditions imposed in the
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B. Generic Zoning for Affordable Housing
In articulating a town-wide policy of encouraging the production of
affordable housing, a municipality may consider using more generic
and predictable methods of zoning.3 2 A town may pass an ordinance
authorizing the construction of high density housing in certain ar-
eas, 3 3 without predetermining or "mapping" the precise parcels on
which affordable housing may be located. Instead, parcels are identi-
fied when a developer makes an application for permission to build
affordable housing under the ordinance. Two examples of this type of
zoning are "special permit" zoning34 and "floating zone" zoning. 5
1. The Special Use Permit
The special use permit is a flexible zoning device which expressly
allows a use under specified circumstances. The municipality may im-
pose conditions upon that use.36
Typically, communities employ special use permits to control uses
that are desirable yet potentially incompatible with existing surround-
ing uses.37 Using this technique, some localities permit the construc-
tion of churches, funeral parlors, or filling stations in residential areas.
When included in the zoning code, such uses are found to be consis-
tent with the comprehensive plan and, with the imposition of appro-
priate conditions, they do not adversely affect the neighborhoods in
their zoning districts.3 8 Recently, special use permits have been em-
ployed to permit greater density as a bonus to the developer who ful-
zoning ordinance preserved the character of the neighborhood and benefitted the sur-
rounding property owners. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the conditions were rea-
sonable in light of the zoning change. Id.
32. See A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 41.05(3) (4th ed.
1975) [hereinafter A. RATHKOPF].
33. Id.
34. See generally R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, §§ 24.01-.26.
35. See id. § 5.12.
36. See A. RATHKOPF, supra note 32, § 40.01-.06. The special use permit differs from
conditional zoning in that with the permit the necessary zoning is created by an amend-
ment to the zoning ordinance which contains the detailed requirements for the produc-
tion of affordable housing. In conditional zoning, the legislation creating the zoning
arises initially with the application of a developer to rezone a specific parcel to suit his
projected needs.
37. See id. § 41.01.
38. See Penny Arcade, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Oyster Bay, 75 A.D.2d 620, 427 N.Y.S.2d
52 (2d Dep't 1980); North Shore Equities, Inc. v. Fritts, 81 A.D.2d 985, 440 N.Y.S.2d 84
(3d Dep't 1981); R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 24.03. Although all of these uses are
desirable, each creates a specific problem-generally, that of traffic congestion. The in-
conveniences created by the granting of the permit, however, can be minimized through
the imposition of conditions. See Coon, Plan Approval Procedures, reprinted in P. BUCK,
MODERN LAND USE CONTROL 101 (1978); R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 24.17.
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fills the social need of providing affordable housing for policemen,
firemen, the elderly, and the young people of the community.39
The authority of a municipality to grant or deny special use permits
is implied from the general statutory power to regulate land use for
the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 4° Original ju-
risdiction in granting special use permits may be given to the Planning
Board or the Zoning Board of Appeals. 41 Although no statutes ex-
pressly authorize special use permits, courts have long upheld their
use, with minimal restrictions.42
Examples of this use of the special permit abound. In New Jersey,
the Supreme Court upheld the application of a special use permit to
provide housing for the elderly;43 the Massachusetts Enabling Statute
specifically allows towns to issue special use permits to induce devel-
opers to provide housing for people of low and moderate income;
44
and the City of New York used the special permit to control develop-
ment in the Manhattan Bridge District.45
The New York Appellate Division, First Department, upheld a
challenge to the Manhattan Bridge District'ordinance in Asian Ameri-
39. See A. RATHKOPF, supra note 32, § 41.03.
40. N.Y. TOWN LAW § 261 (McKinney 1932, amended 1956); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW
§ 7-700 (1972); see North Shore Steak House v. Board of Appeals, 30 N.Y.2d 238, 243,
282 N.E.2d 606, 609, 331 N.Y.S.2d 645, 649 (1972).
41. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 24.08.
42. See, e.g., Simensky v. Mangravite, 16 A.D.2d 977, 230 N.Y.S.2d 170 (2d Dep't
1962), aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 908, 188 N.E.2d 270, 237 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1963) (Second Depart-
ment holding that a special use permit procedure may be applied only to uses permitted
by the zoning ordinance subject to approval by official body); see'also Bernstein v. Board
of Appeals, 60 Misc. 2d 470, 302 N.Y.S.2d 141 (N.Y. Sup, Ct. 1969) (town board's power
to impose conditions only as broad as power to regulate the use).
43. See Shepard v. Woodland Township Comm. & Planning B d., 71 N.J. 230, 364
A.2d 1005 (1976).
44. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 40A, § 9 (1985).
45. See Asian Ams. for Equality v. Koch, 128 A.D.2d 99, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939 (1st
Dep't 1987), aff'd, 72 N.Y.2d 121, 527 N.E.2d 265, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1988). The City
created a Special Manhattan Bridge District in its Chinatown area to preserve the resi-
dential character of the Chinatown community, to permit new construction within an
area sensitive to the existing urban design character of the neighborhood, to provide an
incentive for a mixture of income groups, to encourage development of new community
facility space, to promote the rehabilitation of the existing older housing stock, to cause
minimal residential relocation, and to facilitate housing accommodations for residents
close to their places of employment. Id.
In order to control the development in this district, the City incorporated regulations
which employed the discretionary power of the Planning Commission to issue special use
permits. In issuing special use permits for new construction, the Planning Commission
had the ability and the discretion to increase the density (through an increase in the floor
area ratio) if the developer furnished space for community facilities, provided dwelling
units for low and moderate income families, and rehabilitated existing substandard hous-
ing. Id.
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cans for Equality v. Koch.46 The court found that the special use per-
mit regulations incorporated in the City Zoning Code were within the
bounds of the city's police power.47 In so determining, the court
stated:
[the] decision as to how a community shall be zoned or rezoned, as
to how various properties shall be classified or reclassified, rests
with the local legislative body; its judgment and determination will
be conclusive, beyond interference from the courts, unless shown
to be arbitrary, and the burden of establishing such arbitrariness is
imposed upon him who asserts it.4"
Clearly, municipalities may employ the special use permit to in-
crease developmental density and to provide affordable housing. In so
doing, however, the town must articulate a use that the zoning ordi-
nance allows and that is consistent with the town's comprehensive
plan.49 Furthermore, the municipality must specify a procedure for
applying for a special use permit,' 0 including the scope of the applica-
tion, notice of the application, time and place of a public hearing, and
the appropriate findings that must be made. Finally, the municipality
must set out standards for granting or denying special use permits.5'
If a municipality follows these procedures, makes findings in accord-
ance with the standards set out in the zoning ordinance, and imposes
conditions reasonably related to the findings and to the project, then a
court will uphold the use of the special permit as a valid assertion of a
municipality's police power.52
2. Floating Zone
The floating zone operates in two distinct stages: first, the munici-
pality enacts a floating zone ordinance complete with the zone's own
use, area and bulk requirements, but not imposed on any specific par-
cel; later, the municipality votes to apply the floating zone to a partic-
ular parcel of land upon the request of a developer. The floating zone
then, in theory, "floats above the landscape in anticipation of being
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 101, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 941 (quoting Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302
N.Y. 115, 121, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1951)).
49. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW § 274-a(l)(a) (McKinney 1987).
51. See A. RATHKOPF, supra note 32, § 41.08; see also R. ANDERSON, supra note 25,
at § 24.12 n.4.
52. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, §§ 24.02-.05, at 265-71. Conversely, a munici-
pality may not withhold a special use permit for reasons unrelated to the public health
and welfare. Id. § 24.14, at 289 & n.6 (citing Green Point Sav. Bank v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 281 N.Y. 534, 24 N.E.2d 319, appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 633 (1939)).
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brought down to earth by an amendment rezoning the area in ques-
tion. It is a use classification which is not employed until needed nor
pinned down to any area until the necessity arises." '5 3
Such a zoning device facilitates the creation of affordable housing
while avoiding the typical economic constraints of Euclidian zoning.54
With floating zoning, developers first purchase land at prevailing
prices and then apply for increased density, which the municipality
will grant in return for a commitment to build affordable housing.
This scheme enables the developer to avoid the impact on prices
sometimes associated with rezoning for higher density uses.
The use of the floating zone, however, may be considered unfair to
those property owners who purchased in reliance on a particular zon-
ing scheme, and subsequently face the possibility that the area will be
developed at higher densities. In the seminal case of Rodgers v. Vil-
lage of Tarrytown, New York's highest court sustained the floating
zone technique in the face of such objections." Thus, when a munici-
pality enacts such a zone, the courts, following Rodgers, will uphold it
so long as it is done in conformance with the comprehensive plan.5 6
The floating zone technique is especially useful to a town experienc-
ing population growth and seeking not only to retain housing for ex-
isting middle income residents but also to develop new moderate
income housing. The floating zone encourages the private sector to
provide housing for the full range of income groups, in conformance
with the objectives of the comprehensive plan.5 7 It also helps to inte-
grate income groups throughout the community, thereby avoiding
53. R. WRIGHT & M. GITELMAN, LAND USE 719 (3d ed. 1982) (citing Comment,
Zoning-the Floating Zone: A Potential Instrument of Versatile Zoning, 16 CATH. U.L.
REV. 85, 87 (1966)).
54. Euclidean zoning refers to a rigid form of zoning by which density, land use, and
lot size are regulated uniformly throughout a zoning district. See Village of Euclid v.
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
55. 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951). In 1947, Tarrytown enacted an ordinance
establishing a floating zone which, upon application by a developer, could be applied to
areas of 10 acres or more. The resulting rezoning enabled more units to be built on a
particular parcel than its current zone allowed. The ordinance creating the floating zone
and the subsequent amendment rezoning a piece of land was challenged as being illegal
spot zoning. The court focused not on whether the area rezoned within a larger area was
of different use, but instead on whether the rezoning was for the benefit of an individual
land owner or for the benefit of the entire community pursuant to the comprehensive
plan. Because the town was empowered to adopt such amendments and did so according
to appropriate procedures, the zoning amendments were upheld as a valid exercise of the
municipality's police power.
56. See Nappi v. LaGuardia, 184 Misc. 775, 55 N.Y.S. 80 (1944), aff'd, 269 A.D.
693, 54 N.Y.S. 722, aff'd, 295 N.Y. 652, 64 N.E.2d 716 (1945); Tata v. Town of Babylon,
52 Misc. 2d 667, 276 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1967); see also R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 24.12.
57. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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concentrations of lower income groups in discrete neighborhoods.
This technique, however, along with special permits and conditional
zoning, often encounters claims that it constitutes illegal "spot" or
"contract" zoning."
C. Common Law Restraints on the Creation of Affordable
Housing: Spot and Contract Zoning
Zoning to create affordable housing may be challenged as "spot" or
"contract" zoning if it singles out a particular parcel or landowner for
special treatment. Zoning of this sort may exceed a municipality's
authority if it is adopted without consideration of, or is at variance
with, the municipality's comprehensive plan.5 9
Spot zoning singles out one small parcel of land for a use classifica-
tion totally different from the surrounding area,6" and confers a bene-
fit to one landowner to the detriment of his neighbors.6 Spot zoning
is not, however, per se illegal; it is illegal only if it is inconsistent with
the municipality's comprehensive plan.62 Zoning not in conformance
with the plan is "ultra vires," that is, in excess of the municipality's
statutory authority to zone.63 Thus, a proposed zoning amendment is
illegal as spot zoning if it is designed to benefit only the owner of the
rezoned property. On the other hand, courts will uphold zoning
which benefits the community by furthering the objectives of its com-
prehensive plan. Additionally, courts will approve zoning which is
reasonable in light of the surrounding conditions.64
58. For definitions of spot and contract zoning, see supra note 25.
59. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
60. R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 5.04; Rodgers v. Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96
N.E.2d 731 (1951); Kravetz v. Plenge, 84 A.D.2d 422, 446 N.Y.S.2d 807 (4th Dep't
1982). See generally Note, Zoning-The Non-Conforming Use and Spot Zoning, 1 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 286 (1952).
61. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 5.04; Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Martin, 12
N.Y.2d 1082, 190 N.E.2d 422, 240 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1963).
62. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 5.04; Jackson & Perkins Co., 12 N.Y.2d 1082,
190 N.E.2d 422, 240 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1963).
63. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 2.04 n.9 (citing Coley v. Cambell, 126 Misc.
869, 215 N.Y.S. 679 (1926), and Geisler v. Mitchell, 137 Misc. 462, 244 N.Y.S. 439 (Sup.
Ct. 1930)).
64. See, e.g., Collard v. Village of Flower Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 600, 421 N.E.2d 818,
821, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 329 (1981) (applying a two-part test in determining that the vil-
lage's zoning ordinance constituted an impermissible use of spot zoning: if the zoning
change is part of a comprehensive plan calculated to serve the general welfare of the
community, and if the zoning change is reasonable in relation to the neighborhood, then
there is no impermissable use of spot zoning); see also Levine v. Oyster Bay, 26 A.D.2d
583, 272 N.Y.S.2d 171 (2d Dep't 1966) (where fourteen acres of land were rezoned from
residential to industrial use and the evidence showed that this was the first industrial
intrusion into the area and that the town's master plan contained no intention of moving
1989] AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Zoning to create affordable housing may also be challenged as ille-
gal contract zoning, by which a town agrees with a private landowner
to rezone a parcel or area,65 and in so doing, bargains away its zoning
power. 66 Courts seldom invoke the general prohibition against con-
tract zoning. They usually require proof of a binding agreement with
a developer before they will invalidate the town's actions.67
Courts will uphold zoning ordinances which trade greater density
on specific parcels in exchange for more affordable housing, provided
those laws are designed to further the objectives of the comprehensive
plan. The prohibitions against contract and spot zoning do not, of
themselves, bar such initiatives.68 Such ordinances will withstand
court challenges based on these claims, if it is clear that the laws are
in accordance with the comprehensive plan, that the conditions im-
posed are reasonable and that the zoning is responsive to proven
housing needs.
D. Preferences
In acting to induce the creation of affordable housing, localities
sometimes adopt policies requiring such housing to be marketed, on a
preferential basis, to groups such as senior citizens, young families,
public sector employees, volunteer firemen, or private sector employ-
ees.69 To be sustained as a valid exercise of the zoning authority,
towards industrial growth, court concluded that the zoning change benefitted only the
landowner and not the general public, and was thus illegal spot zoning). See generally R.
ANDERSON, supra note 25, §§ 5.04-.09.
65. See A. RATHKOPF, supra note 32, §§ 1.04(2)(d), 27.05.
66. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 25, § 9.15.
67. Id.; see, e.g., Century Circuit, Inc. v. Ott, 65 Misc. 2d 250, 253, 317 N.Y.S.2d 468,
471 (Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 1044, 327 N.Y.S.2d 829 (2d Dep't 1971). In Cen-
tury Circuit, the town amended its ordinance to eliminate an off street parking require-
ment. The amendment was made pursuant to a request by an applicant who wanted to
build a theater but could not obtain off street parking space. The applicant offered to
widen the city street in lieu of meeting the parking requirement. This was determined not
to be contract zoning because there was no contract. The court found that the town had
exercised appropriate legislative discretion benefitting the whole community and not just
one particular landowner. Thus, the court concluded that the ordinance was a valid
exercise of the town's zoning authority. See In Re Rosedale Ave., 40 Misc. 2d 1076, 243
N.Y.S.2d 814 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (finding no contract, even though the town signed an agree-
ment with the residents of a residential district prior to.rezoning that even specified the
amount of compensation to be paid to the landowner after the rezoning).
68. Collard v. Village of Flower Hill,-52 N.Y.2d 594, 601, 421 N.E.2d 818, 821-22,
439 N.Y.S.2d 326, 330 (1981) ("a rule which would have the effect of forbidding a munic-
ipality from ... imposing protective conditions ... would not be in the best interests of
the public.").
69. See A. RATHKOPF, supra note 32, § 17.06(b) n.17; Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d
481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993
(1975).
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these official preference schemes must operate within certain legal
limitations and must follow certain guidelines."0
The long standing principle that zoning can regulate the use, but
not the ownership or users of the land, challenges the legality of pref-
erences.7 Arguably, zoning incentives that use occupancy prefer-
ences to influence who may rent or buy affordable housing constitute
unauthorized limitations on potential users of property. An equally
formidable obstacle to the use of such preference schemes is the alle-
gation that they are unconstitutionally discriminatory. Initial at-
tempts to prohibit certain persons from owning land were struck
down as unconstitutional because of their discriminatory nature.7 2
Such ordinances, because of their exclusionary effect, were found to
have no reasonable relationship to the purpose of zoning.73
When a court is faced with a zoning ordinance alleged to violate the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 71 or the Equal Protection Clause of the four-
70. See infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
71.,Weinrib v. Weisler, 33 A.D.2d 923, 307 N.Y.S.2d 603 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 27
N.Y.2d 592, 261 N.E.2d 406, 313 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1970); A. RATHKOPF, supra note 32,
§ 1.04.
72. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (declaring zoning ordinance uncon-
stitutional because it restricted the use of land based on race); see also Seattle Title.Trust
Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928) (attempt to exclude a philanthropic home from a
residential neighborhood held unconstitutional).
73. Id.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982) (Civil Rights Act of 1866). This Act gives all citizens
equal rights to purchase property. Denying that right by restricting the availability of
housing to a limited group or groups could violate this law. The Civil Rights Act in-
cludes a specific body of law that regulates the occupancy of housing called the Federal
Fair Housing Law. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1982). This provision forbids occupancy stan-
dards based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and, by recent amendment,
handicap. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, H.R. RES. 1158, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 10,562 (1988). See also N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5) (McKinney
1989); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988), reh'g denied, 109 S. Ct. 824 (1989) (challenging town's re-
fusal to rezone an R-40 zoning district in order to enable plaintiffs to build a federally
financed, integrated, low-income multifamily housing project). The Town of Huntington,
invoking an unusual procedural device, denied the rezoning because the project was
outside a designated urban renewal area. 844 F.2d at 928-33. The court held that the
town's decision created a discriminatory effect within the town, since the minority popu-
lation resided almost exclusively within the urban renewal area. Id. at 937-38. Further-
more, the court found that this effect was not balanced by legitimate and bona fide public
concerns. Id. at 939-40. By limiting development of low income housing to the urban
renewal area, the town continued the segregation of minority families. Id. at 939-41. The
court directed the town to rezone the proposed site to allow low income housing to be
constructed in a predominantly white, single family neighborhood. Id. at 942. The
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on narrow grounds, holding that the action
of the town was repugnant to federal law, leaving open the standard that is to be used to
determine what proof of disparate impact on minorities is needed in these federal cases.
109 S. Ct. 276 (1988).
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teenth amendment,75 the question becomes whether the restrictions
reasonably relate to the purpose of zoning-that is, whether they are
calculated to achieve the objectives of the comprehensive plan.76 If
the ordinance specifically discriminates against a constitutionally pro-
tected class, the inquiry is whether the restriction is necessary to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest." Where a racial, religious,
or ethnic minority is specifically excluded by a zoning preference
scheme, the locality must advance a highly compelling justification."
Under state law, the determinative question is whether the purpose
of zoning includes proViding housing in the community for various
preference groups such as senior citizens, young people, volunteer
firemen, and workers needed for available public and private sector
jobs.. The answer, of course, depends on what precisely the commu-
nity seeks to accomplish through its particular housing preference
scheme, and how closely related the scheme is to the purposes of the
comprehensive plan.79
A New York court has provided relatively clear guidance to munic-
ipalities considering occupancy preferences for affordable housing. In
Maldini v. Ambro,80 residents brought suit claiming that the town ex-
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment provides for equal protection of
the law for all persons. In order to determine if a piece of legislation, such as an adopted
housing preference scheme, discriminates against a class of persons, the courts must first
categorize the class. If the classification is not "suspect"-classifications based on other
than race, ethnicity, national origin, and gender-then the court will use the rational
basis test to determine whether that classification is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974).
If, however, the classification is suspect, then the legislation must be necessary to promote
a compelling governmental interest, or the law will be invalidated. This test is referred to
as the strict scrutiny test. Arkansas Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 236
(1987).
76. See supra notes 57-62; see also infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 73; see also infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
78. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
79. Allen v. Town of N. Hempstead, 103 A.D.2d 144, 478 N.Y.S.2d 919 (2d Dep't
1984) (classifying a local residency requirement for senior citizen housing as unconstitu-
tionally exclusionary, and finding no compelling local government interest in restricting
occupancy to local residents, in light of the severe regional shortage of housing for the
elderly); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d
672 (1975) (holding that a municipality may not enact a zoning ordinance exclusively for
the benefit of its residents while ignoring regional needs that were not met); cf Campbell
v. Berraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909 (2d Dep't 1977) (concluding that age was
not a suspect class and that restricting occupancy to people over 55 was a rational means
of achieving the legitimate government objective of providing affordable housing to the
elderly).
80. 36 N.Y.2d 481, 330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S.
993 (1975). The town of Huntington had created a Retirement Community District
which allowed "multiple residences designed to provide living and dining accommoda-
tions, including social, health care, or other supportive services and facilities for aged
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ceeded its authority in creating an age-oriented zoning district. In
sustaining the highly specific preferential ordinance, the court wrote:
[the fact that] the 'users' of the retirement community district have
been considered in creating the zoning classification does not nec-
essarily render the amendment suspect, nor does it clash with
traditional 'use'-concepts of zoning. Including the needs of po-
tential 'users' cannot be disassociated from sensible community
planning based upon the 'use' to which property is to be put. The
line between legitimate and illegitimate exercise of the zoning
power cannot be drawn by resort to formula, but as in other areas
of the law, will vary with surrounding circumstances and condi-
tions. Therefore, it cannot be said that the board acted unreasona-
bly in this case in making special provision for housing designed
for the elderly, one of the major groupings within our population.8 '
In upholding the preference, the court stressed that the need for these
restrictions was clear and had been carefully considered by the town,
that the "class" of older people was a broad one, and that there was
no evidence on the record that the town intended to segregate the
community according to age or to discriminate against younger peo-
ple. 2 The court held, furthermore, that " '[a]ge' considerations are
appropriately made if rationally related to the achievement of a
proper governmental objective. Here, as already indicated, meeting
the community shortage of suitable housing accommodations for its
population, including an important segment of that population with
special needs, is such an objective." 3 This specific language explicitly
states what the court implied throughout the decision: an ordinance
is an appropriate exercise of the zoning authority if the facts show a
"shortage of suitable housing," if the beneficiary group is a "segment
of that population with special needs," if the classification is "ration-
ally related to the achievement of a proper governmental objective,"
and if a "sensible community planning" base exists. 4
The Maldini decision is a specific illustration of the general notion
that a zoning preference will be found to be reasonable if it was en-
acted in conformance with the comprehensive plan. As discussed in
Part I, comprehensive plans routinely address such legitimate zoning
issues as achieving a demographic balance, preserving housing oppor-
persons to be owned and operated by a non-profit corporation . Id. at 483-84, 330
N.E.2d at 405, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 388. This ordinance is highly specific: it regulates the
type of housing, the occupant, and the builder and owner.
81. Id. at 487-88, 330 N.E.2d at 407-08, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
82. Id. at 487, 330 N.E.2d at 407, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id.
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tunities for young and old residents of limited means, stabilizing and
enhancing the tax base, and maintaining essential municipal and pub-
lic services. A reasonable basis for the adoption of a housing prefer-
ence plan can be found to exist where a community has identified a
serious community need that can be solved through the provision of
affordable housing, has pinpointed the needs of the particular groups
suffering from that shortage, and has shown the relationship between
housing that population and fulfilling the objectives of the compre-
hensive plan.
E. Perpetuating Affordability
When local governments take formal action to ensure the creation
of affordable housing, they expect that such housing will remain af-
fordable over time, perhaps perpetually. This expectation, however,
cannot be realized automatically.8 5 Without appropriate controls, the
purchaser of affordable housing could resell the unit at the market
rate for a windfall profit or, in the case of an owner of a rental housing
development, significantly increase the rents after the initial rental.86
Whenever this happens, the public purpose in creating affordable
housing is frustrated. Preventing these abuses may be called "perpet-
uating affordability." 87
To perpetuate the affordability of rental housing, rents must be reg-
ulated and the sale of the building must be restricted so that if the
building is sold, rent regulations will apply to the new owner. When
affordable houses are sold to their occupants, the initial sales price
and resale prices must be fixed by some method. 88 Zoning ordinances
85. In conversations a few years ago with the town manager of Lexington, Massachu-
setts and the Supervisor of the Town of Somers, New York, -the author learned of failed
attempts to create affordable housing. In Lexington, the town sold two excess schools to
developers for affoidable housing. In each case, the transfer of title was not conditioned
on the perpetuation of affordability. In Somers, land was rezoned to a higher density to
allow the developer to provide affordable housing, but no condition on the rezoning re-
garding future price increases was imposed. The result in both towns was the immediate
resale of the affordable units at market prices, providing windfall .profits to the first own-
ers and removing the units from the inventory of affordable units in the community.
86. See Sweet & Hack, Mitchell-Lama Buyouts: Policy Issues and Alternatives, 17
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117 (1989).
87. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text; see also A. RATHKOPF, supra note
32, § 17.06(3)(b) n.12.
88. One often employed deed restriction requires the owner of an affordable unit to
offer it for sale to a non-profit agency representing the municipality at an indexed price.
The price may be calculated by inflating the price paid by the owner by using a factor
such as the Consumer Price Index. The non-profitagency may then assign its right to the
next person on the municipality's waiting list, who is then enabled to buy it at the indexed
price. See, e.g., Moderately Priced Housing Program of Montgomery County, Maryland,
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., CODE ch. 25A (1988).
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or actions which create affordable housing routinely require develop-
ers, as a condition of the rezoning and a precondition to the issuance
of a certificate of occupancy, to file deed restrictions regarding rents
or sale prices.8 9
The need to restrict the price or value of real estate confronts com-
mon law and statutory principles that protect the alienation of prop-
erty from unreasonable restrictions. The question, therefore, is under
what circumstances are municipal restrictions on the price of housing
legal.
1. Legal Restrictions on the Alienation of Property
There are two basic common law rules which restrict the free alien-
ation of property-the rule against perpetuities,9" and the general rule
against unreasonable restraints on the alienation of property.9
These rules, in large part modified by statute, serve several useful
purposes: (1) they ensure the productive use and development of
property; (2) they facilitate the exchange of property; (3) they free
property from unknown or embarrassing impediments to alienability;
and (4) they limit the power of an owner to create uncertain future
estates.
92
The New York Court of Appeals, in Metropolitan Transportation
Authority v. Bruken Realty Corp. (MTA),93 has recently reviewed
these rules with respect to the right of first refusal, 94 which is often
89. See Code of the Town of Bedford § 125-56.
90. The rule against perpetuities states that no interest in property is valid unless it
will vest within the lifetime of an individual or within 21 years after that individual's
death. New York has incorporated this rule into the N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW
§ 9-1.1(b) (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1990). In simple terms, this rule requires that inter-
ests created in real estate come into effect within reasonable and measurable periods. The
assignable right of first refusal, discussed supra in note 79, creates a future interest in real
property which may endure beyond the permitted period.
91. At common law, a conveyance was held invalid if it imposed unreasonable re-
straints on the future alienation, that is, on the sale or disposition, of real property. This
rule forbade owners from imposing certain conditions on conveyances which would pre-
vent the purchaser from freely disposing of the property. See, e.g., Schnebly, Restraints
Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests (pts. 1-111), 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 (1935).
92. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF PROPERTY (2d ed. 1975); R. POWELL,
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (1968).
93. 67 N.Y.2d 156, 492 N.E.2d 379, 501 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1986) [hereinafter MTA].
The MTA owned the property, and air rights were conveyed to a second party. An option
agreement allowed the second party to purchase the land if the MTA determined that the
property was no longer needed for transportation purposes. This right was limited to 99
years, and was to be exercised within 90 days of the MTA's decision to sell. The purchase
price was established as the fair market value at the time the right to purchase was exer-
cised. For an example of how the right of first refusal is used in the context of zoning for
affordable housing, see infra note 75.
94. The right of first refusal gives the property holder the first right to purchase the
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employed in land transactions involving public or quasi-public agen-
cies.95 The court held that the rule against perpetuities does not auto-
matically apply to rights of first refusal in this context. 96 In so
holding, the court reasoned that a right of first refusal imposes only a
minor impediment to the transfer of property, and promotes the use
and development of the property without forcing an owner to sell.
The court stated that the violation of the rule against perpetuities is
"properly offset by [the] utility [of the right of first refusal] in modern
legal transactions and that usefulness justifies excepting [it] from the
operation of the rule." 97
In order to ensure free alienbility, however, the court analyzed the
validity of the right of first refusal by applying the common law rule
prohibiting unreasonable restraints of alienability.98 The reasonable-
ness of such a restraint rests on its duration, price, and purpose.99
Applying this test of reasonableness, the MTA court found the pur-
pose, the duration and the price reasonable. "
Although the court in MTA limited its holding to preemptive rights
in commercial and governmental transactions,'' the New York Ap-
pellate Division, First Department has applied the principle to a right
property if the owner decides to sell. The MTA court distinguished between an option
right and a right of first refusal:
An option grants to the holder the power to compel the owner of property to
sell it whether the owner is willing to part with ownership or not. A preemptive
right, or right of first refusal, does not give its holder the power to compel an
unwilling owner to sell; it merely requires the owner, when and if he decides to
sell, to offer the property first to the party holding the preemptive right so that
he may meet a third-party offer or buy the property at some other price set by a
previously stipulated method. Once the owner decides to sell the property, the
holder of the preemptive right may choose to buy it or not, but the choice exists
only after he receives an offer from the owner. If the holder decides not to buy,
then the owner may sell to anyone.
Id. at 163, 492 N.E.2d at 382, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 309 (citations omitted).
95. MTA, 67 N.Y.2d 156, 492 N.E.2d 379, 501 N.Y.S.2d 306.
96. Id. at 163, 492 N.E.2d at 382, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 309.
97. Id. at 164, 492 N.E.2d at 383, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 310. In arriving at this conclusion,
the court looked at early cases that held similarly. A Pennsylvania case upheld an option
to purchase imposed by a municipality. The court held that the option was in the public
interest and that the government was not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Id. at
165, 492 N.E.2d at 384, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 311 (citing Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. v.
Philadelphia Transp. Co., 426 Pa. 377, 233 A.2d 15 (1967)).
98. Id. at 166, 492 N.E.2d at 384, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
99. Id. at 167, 492 N.E.2d at 385, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 312. What is reasonable? In
MTA, the duration was deemed reasonable because it was measured by the time given to
exercise the right to purchase after receipt of notice of the decision to sell. Id. The price
was fair because it was set at market value, and the purpose was beneficial because it
provided unity of ownership of the ground lots and the air rights. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 166, 492 N.E.2d at 384, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 311.
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of first refusal in the context of a private condominium association.
In Anderson v. 50 E. 72nd St. Condominium, o2 the court excepted
condominium preemptive rights from the rule against perpetuities be-
cause the enforcement of these rights did not violate the underlying
purpose of the rule.103 The court reasoned that the management of a
condominium has a valid interest in protecting the ownership of the
common areas and the underlying fee."o
If reasonably drawn, rights of first refusal and other techniques that
municipalities use to maintain affordable housing will pass the MTA
test."' The purpose of maintaining affordable housing is reasonable
and clearly in the public's interest: "meeting the community shortage
of suitable housing accommodations for its population, including an
important segment of that population with special needs," is a valid
exercise of municipal zoning authority. 106 Such an objective can be
realized,, however, only if affordable housing, once created, remains
affordable. 107
The reasonableness of the duration of a right of first refusal is a
question of fact.'0 s Once the owner notifies the option holder of his
intent to sell, the option holder must exercise his option within a rea-
sonable time. The findings of the courts in MTA and Anderson pro-
vide guidance in determining what is reasonable. Those courts held
that option periods of ninety days and of thirty days, respectively,
were acceptable. 10 9 Somewhat longer intervals might pass muster if
clearly reasonable to accomplish a legitimate objective.
The reasonableness of the exercise price is also a question of fact.
102. 119 A.D.2d 73, 505 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1st Dep't 1986). In Anderson, the condomin-
ium by-laws contained a. right of first refusal exercisable by the board of managers and
applicable to-all the unit owners. The board reserved the right to purchase the unit, or
produce a purchaser, at the same price and on the same terms as offered by a proposed
purchaser found by the condominium owner. This right was to be exercised within thirty
days after notification by the seller that he had found a buyer.
103. Id. at 79, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
104. Id. at 79, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 104.
105. See supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
106. Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 487, 330 N.E.2d 403, 407, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385,
391, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 993 (1975).
107. See Campbell v. Berraud, 58 A.D.2d 570, 572, 394 N.Y.S.2d 909, 912 (2d Dep't
1977), where the Second Department stated that it was illogical to encourage the con-
struction of elderly housing and then prohibit its exclusive use by those it was created to
serve.
108. Metropolitan Transp. Auth. (MTA) v. Bruken Realty Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 156, 162,
492 N.E.2d 379, 381, 501 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1986); Anderson v. 50 E. 72nd St. Condomin-
ium, 119 A.D.2d 73, 79, 505 N.Y.S.2d 101, 104 (1st Dep't 1986). See supra notes 78-84
and accompanying text.
109. MTA, 67 N.Y.2d at 168, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 312, 492 N.E.2d at 385;Anderson, 119
A.D.2d at 79, 505 N.Y.Si2d at 104.
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In MTA and Anderson the value of the property subject to the re-
straint was established by determining its market value, a reasonable
index in that context, where the underlying transaction is governed
only by market forces from beginning to end. The initial price of mu-
nicipally-aided affordable housing, however, is often substantially be-
low market value. Is it realistic to fix the market price as the index of
reasonableness, when the price at which the owner purchased the
property was artificially lowered by municipal regulation in order to
meet a demonstrated need for subsidized housing? The reasonable-
ness of price restrictions should be evaluated by comparing the sales
price, not to market value, but to the initial affordable price. Munici-
pal restrictions that allow an owner of affordable housing to recoup
the original purchase price plus reasonable appreciation serve the
public interest while treating both buyers and sellers of affordable
housing fairly. Such a standard would pass the MTA and Anderson
tests. Moreover, such price restrictions are essential to the public pur-
pose of creating and perpetuating vitally needed affordable housing.
Municipalities can use their zoning powers to influence the develop-
ment of privately held property so as to create affordable housing.
The principles of land use and property law compel this conclusion.
By carefully documenting the public need for affordable housing as
furthering the objectives of the comprehensive plan, and by ensuring
that such housing is marketed and remarketed to those in need, mu-
nicipalities can avoid potential claims of illegality. Where there is a
clear need for affordable housing and the public interest is directly
served by its development, the courts will find that a reasonably con-
ceived and executed regulatory program does not violate the judicially
created rules against spot and contract zoning or the rules against
restraints on the alienation of real property.
III. Municipal Power to Directly Reduce the Cost of Housing
Zoning is not the only weapon in the local arsenal which can be
directed against housing costs. Local governments have the author-
ity, other than through their land use powers, to reduce housing costs
or to produce housing themselves. They can use direct methods of
lowering housing costs such as donating publicly owned land to a de-
veloper conditioned on its use for affordable housing,"' abating real
110. The public land dedication technique is a particularly effective method of creating
affordable housing. If land is sold by local government to any of the quasi-public corpo-
rations discussed below, it may be used by them to develop projects within which most or
all of the units can be affordable. The sine qua non of density bonus zoning is that it must
provide a powerful financial incentive to the private market. This is why the majority of
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property taxes, issuing bonds to provide low-cost mortgages, paying
the costs of community buildings in senior citizen projects, and pay-
ing the costs of off-site improvements.''
New York State empowers municipalities to use these devices
under the Private Housing Finance Law"' and the Public Housing
Law." 3 These statutes create and regulate quasi-public corporations
whose function is to establish affordable housing. In recent years this
authority has not been used aggressively because federal funding for
housing production" 4 (the main impetus for using these statutory
powers) has been severely curtailed. As a result, a misperception has
grown that these historical authorities have little relevance to the con-
temporary challenges of affordable housing. Recent evidence sug-
gests, however, that this statutory authority is as relevant today as it
was during the height of federal housing assistance. 115
the units in a density bonus development are sold at market rates and only a percentage
of them are affordable to moderate or middle income households. When the public sector
owns the land, the need to include a majority of market-rate units in the development is
absent because there is no need to coax land with other valuable uses from private hands.
111. In New York State there is a long tradition of such assistance being given to
affordable housing projects by municipal governments. This tradition grew out of initia-
tives such as public housing, urban renewal, and federally-assisted housing programs,
where localities used extensive statutory authority to further lower the costs of low-in-
come housing projects that were heavily subsidized under federal spending programs. To
protect the public interest, the state legislature limited municipal authority of this type to
projects sponsored by state-chartered development corporations. Such corporations can
be created and operated directly by private developers, by not-for-profit sponsors, or by
the municipalities themselves. See supra notes 87-110, infra notes 112-23 and accompa-
nying text.
112. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 1-806 (McKinney 1976). The Private Housing
Finance Law confers authority on local governments to work with and to assist private
and not-for-profit development entities organized under that law. Id.; see also infra notes
131-53 and accompanying text.
113. N.Y. Pun. Hous. LAW §§ 1-228 (McKinney 1989). Generally, the Public Hous-
ing Law describes the powers that local governments have to assist their local municipal
housing authorities (MHA), which are created by and operate under the Public Housing
Law. Id.; see also infra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
114. In the past decade, the federal government has largely withdrawn its support
from these classic urban programs. The urban renewal program was replaced in 1974 by
the Community Development Block Grant Program. Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1976). Funding for low and moder-
ate income housing construction programs has been curtailed and many of the programs
themselves discontinued. See Nolon, Reexamining Federal Housing Programs in a Time
of Fiscal Austerity: The Trend Toward Block Grants and Housing Allowances, 14 URn.
LAW. 249 (1982).
115. For example, in Orangetown, New York, the town rezoned a parcel of town-
owned land to a higher density, sold it to a corporation organized under the Private
Housing Finance Law, and has agreed to provide financial assistance to the project after
that corporation develops the property and transfers title to the local housing authority,
created under the Public Housing Law. In Bedford, New York, the developer of a prop-
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This Part examines, first, the authority that localities have to assist
their local Municipal Housing Authority (MHA) in developing and
operating public housing projects under the Public Housing Law; it
then analyzes local authority to assist privately initiated developments
under the Private Housing Finance Law.
A. The Public Housing Law
The New York Public Housing Law was the first statute of its kind
in the nation. Passed originally in 1926 as the State Housing Law," 6
it was amended and recodified in 1939 as the Public Housing Law. "7
The statute addressed the question of whether the expenditure of mu-
nicipal funds for the provision of lower income housing was a public
purpose to which tax dollars could be dedicated."'
The answer, an emphatic yes, was first voiced in the Public Hous-
ing Law which provided for the construction and operation of low
rent public housing by MHAs." 9 The statute authorized MHAs to
issue bonds to provide low cost financing, to condemn land and lower
its cost, and to abate local property taxes to reduce the operating cost
of such housing.' 2 ° In all cases, the local public housing authority
erty rezoned for affordable housing has transferred ownership of a portion of the parcel to
a Private Housing Finance Law regulated company, which is eligible for tax-exempt fi-
nancing provided by the New York State Housing Finance Agency. Finally, in Harrison,
New York, the town is moving toward the transfer of two parcels of town-owned land, at
a below-market price, to a corporation to be organized under art. XI of the Private Hous-
ing Finance Law, using authority contained in that statute.
116. New York State Housing Law, 1926 N.Y. Laws 823 (in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW
§§ 2251-2343 (McKinney 1936)). This original law preceded the first federal law on the
subject by more than a decade. See United States Housing Act of 1937, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 1401-30 (1976). The federal statute made available direct subsidies to local govern-
mental bodies to enable them to develop, own and manage housing for low-income house-
holds and to encourage the replacement of slums with newly constructed housing.
117. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW §§ 1-228 (McKinney 1939).
118. Article VIII, § 1, of the New York State Constitution, § 1, states that no munici-
pality "shall give or loan any money or property to or in the aid of any individual, or
private corporation or association, or private undertaking .... " First proposed by the
Constitutional Commission of 1872 and adopted by the people in 1874, this constitutional
provision is the principal obstacle that must be overcome if localities are to provide finan-
cial assistance to affordable housing projects, which are clearly "private undertakings" in
the aid of individuals, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution and statute.
In 1938, article XVIII was added to the state constitution making it clear that the state
legislature could delegate to local governments the authority to assist a variety of quasi-
public corporations in reducing the cost of housing in several specific ways.
119. See N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW §§ 30-57, 400-566 (McKinney 1989). This law was
enacted pursuant to the constitutional authority contained in art. XVIII. See supra note
89. Under this law, the MHAs are created by state charter at local request and become
local institutions with their board members selected by locally elected leaders. N.Y. PUB.
Hous. LAW §§ 30-57, 400-566 (McKinney 1989).
120. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW §§ 30-57 (McKinney 1989).
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owns and operates projects created in this way. 2 '
Local housing authorities in New York State have used the financ-
ing arrangements of the federal public housing subsidy programs to
guarantee the repayment of the principal and interest on the bonds
issued to finance the construction of their projects and to subsidize the
projects' operating costs. 22 In this way, truly affordable public hous-
ing for the poor was made possible. Although local MHAs have
rarely issued bonds unsupported by the federal subsidies, they can use
their substantial authority under both state and municipal law to as-
sist them in creating financially feasible projects for people of lower
income. 12 This power, especially important given the current reduc-
tion of federal assistance for lower income housing projects, encom-
passes a variety of specific cost cutting techniques available to local
MHAs and their host communities.
24
Once public housing is constructed, the issue of who may occupy
these projects remains. 25 A person or family having income insuffi-
cient to "cause private enterprise" to build housing qualifies as "low
income" for the purpose of the public housing law. 126 Under this
standard, a wide range of occupants are eligible for public housing.
The MHA can select from among them those with sufficient resources
to pay the costs of the project, thus enabling it to construct and oper-
ate housing without large federal subsidies.
Even without federal subsidies, however, localities can make public
housing projects affordable to those of very low income by using their
broad powers to assist them financially. These formidable powers in-
clude the following: an MHA can issue tax exempt bonds to finance
121. See id. § 37.
122. United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1976).
123. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
124. Id.
125. See N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 3 (McKinney 1939). The definition of who may be
housed in MHA financed housing projects is very broad. "The terms 'persons of low
income' and 'families of low income' mean persons or families who are in the low income
groups and who cannot afford to pay enough to cause private enterprise in their munici-
pality to build a sufficient supply of adequate, safe and sanitary dwellings." Id.
126. Some greater specificity was attempted by the Court of Appeals in Chelcy v. Buf-
falo Mun. Hous. Auth., 24 Misc. 2d 598, 605, 206 N.Y.S.2d 158, 166 (Erie County 1960)
(quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3). In Chelcy, the court defined "low income" as
meaning income below the usual rate or amount of wages. The court noted, however, that
where there is a reasonable difference regarding what constitutes "low income" at a given
time and place, the court should not take away the right of an MHA to determine what
that income should be. This confirms prior judicial commentary on the subject. In Borek
v. Golder, 190 Misc. 366, 74 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Oneida County 1947), the court held that
these general definitions of persons and families of low income, with their application left
to local housing authorities, were adequate and constitutional.
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the construction of a low-rent project;' 27 a municipality can make
land available to an MHA, either by selling publicly owned land, or
by condemning privately owned land;' 28 a municipality can provide
infrastructure to support the project; '2 9 and the local government can
subsidize the costs of operating the project.'3 0
A municipality's legislative power to effect the creation of afforda-
ble housing does not end, however, with the Public Housing Law.
Another body of law, the Private Housing Finance Law, if properly
understood and used, can be an effective weapon in a municipality's
affordable housing arsenal.
B. The Private Housing Finance Law
In enacting the Mitchell-Lama Program in 1955,'1 the New York
legislature noted that
[i]t is hereby declared that there exists in municipalities in this
127. Section 41 of the Public Housing Law gives to local housing authorities the power
to issue bonds. That power is not made dependent on the existence of federal assistance
or on the availability of other forms of governmental finance. The bonds of a local hous-
ing authority, backed only by the net revenues of a low-rent housing project, are not
marketable by themselves. To make them so, it is necessary to enhance their credit rat-
ing. One method of accomplishing this is to have the municipality guarantee the MHA
bonds. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 41 (McKinney 1989). This authority is granted to
municipalities under New York's Public Housing Law § 95, which states that "a munici-
pality is authorized to guarantee . . .the principal of and interest on . . .indebtedness
contracted by an authority operating within the territorial limits of.such municipality
.... " Id. § 95. The state comptroller has ruled that this section also authorizes a local
government to pledge future tax revenues for the payment of the debt service of the MHA
bonds. 82 Op. State Compt. 202, 256 (1982).
128. N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 120 (McKinney 1989).
129. Under § 99 of the Public Housing Law, municipalities are authorized to provide
and pay for parks, roads, sidewalks, sewerage or other facilities adjacent to or in connec-
tion with a project of an MHA. Id. § 99.
130. Under § 94 of the Public Housing Law, a municipality may make, or contract to
make, operating subsidies to an MHA. Id. § 94. Similarly, it may annually appropriate
to an MHA the amount required by it for its administrative expenses.
131. The Mitchell-Lama Program, the forerunner of the Private Housing Finance
Law, can trace its roots back to 1926, when the legislature first adopted the Limited
Dividend Housing Companies Law. See N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 70-97 (McKin-
ney 1976 & Supp. 1990). This statute offered to private development corporations tax
concessions and the use of the government's power to condemn land in exchange for rent
and profit limitations in the operations of assisted projects. The legislation was aimed
squarely at the construction of middle-income housing, developed by private enterprise,
but assisted by government action. Apparently, the state legislature in 1926 thought that
acting to solve critical middle-income housing problems was within the general police
power authority then in existence.
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, the issue of government-assisted middle-income
housing was again at the forefront of legislative discussion. The result was a modest
effort tied to early urban renewal initiatives. After the New York Constitutional Conven-
tion adopted art. 18 in 1938, the legislature adopted the Urban Redevelopment Corpora-
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state a seriously inadequate supply of [housing] ... for families and
persons of low income ... necessitating speedy relief which cannot
readily be provided by the ordinary unaided operation of private
enterprise and requiring that provision be made by which private
free enterprise may be encouraged to invest in companies regulated
by law ... and engaged in providing such housing ... for families
or persons of low income; ... that the provision of such [housing]
... by such companies ... are public uses and purposes for which
public money may be loaned and private property may be acquired
by and for such companies and tax exemptions granted .... "'
In 1961, Mitchell-Lama and its progeny-i.e., statutes that en-
courage private enterprise to develop housing for moderate and mid-
dle income persons-were codified into the Private Housing Finance
Law (PHFL). 3 3 The Mitchell-Lama law became Article II of the
PHFL;' 34 the statute creating the state Housing Finance Agency be-
tions Law in 1941 and the Redevelopment Companies Law in 1942. N.Y. PRIV. Hous.
LAW §§ 200-221, 100-126 (McKinney 1976).
These limited initiatives failed to compensate for the dearth of housing production in
that era, and for the dramatic post-war increase in housing demand. A booming popula-
tion of households existed whose incomes were barely high enough to make them ineligi-
ble for federally assisted low-income housing programs, and yet insufficient to cause the
private market to provide housing for them. See generally Note, Homeownership for the
Poor. The Rockefeller Program, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 811, 849 (1969).
In response, the legislature enacted the Limited Profit Housing Companies Law in
1955, popularly known as the Mitchell-Lama Program. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW
§§ 10-37 (McKinney 1976). This statute permitted the government to provide low inter-
est, long term mortgages to private developers who agreed to limit rents and profits. The
law authorized localities and the state government to make 90%, 50-year loans to Lim-
ited Profit Companies incorporated under the Mitchell-Lama law. Such loans were
funded by bonds issued by the state or local governments and sold to the public. See
generally Sweet & Hack. Mitchell-Lama Buyouts: Policy Issues and Alternatives, 17
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117 (1989).
In 1960, the legislature created the New York State Housing Finance Agency (HFA)
to provide direct mortgage financing to Limited Profit Companies. N.Y. PRiv. Hous.
FIN. LAW §§ 40-62 (McKinney 1976). The HFA enabled the state to circumvent the
state constitution's requirement that all long-term government borrowing be approved in
a state-wide referendum. As a separate agency, the HFA could borrow without referen-
dum, and its bonds were made marketable by the pledge of the state's "moral obligation"
to pay if the HFA defaulted.
132. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1976).
133. Id. §§ 1-805.
134. The Limited-Profit Housing Companies Law was passed in 1955 for the purpose
of providing safe and sanitary dwellings for persons of low income. Id. § 11. The Legis-
lature amended this law in 1968 declaring that the "improvement of the physical environ-
ment and revitalization of the quality of urban life in [urban] municipalities would be
promoted by cooperative action by tenants who are persons or families of low income to
acquire ownership of their dwellings and to operated them on a nonprofit basis." Id.
§ 11-a(2-a). To realize this purpose, the legislature made available to low income cooper-
ative tenants long-term financing on a favorable basis and tax exemption. Id.
The Limited-Profit Housing Companies Law provides for the creation of Limited-
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came Article III; the Limited Dividend Housing Companies Law'35
became Article IV; the Redevelopment Companies Law13 6 became
Article V; and Article VI included the Urban Redevelopment Corpo-
rations Law. Article IX authorized local governments to acquire
property for housing companies by gift, purchase, condemnation, or
otherwise. Finally, Article X allowed localities to sell publicly owned
land to housing companies without public bidding, "upon such terms
and conditions as may be agreed upon by such ... municipality and
such housing company." 137
Starting in the 1960s, the state legislature creatively supplemented
the PHFL. In 1966, the state began to assist non-profit developers in
a variety of ways. 13  This trend continued into the 1980s when the
legislature wrote the latest chapter in state-aided housing, adding Ar-
ticles XVIII and XIX to the PHFL. ' 39 These statutes created, respec-
tively, the Low Income Housing Trust Fund Program,"4 operated by
Profit Housing Companies organized under the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation
Law. Id. § 13. The Board of Directors of the Mutual Company is elected by the tenants
entitled to occupancy in the project. Id. § 13(7) (McKinney Supp. 1988). Tenants enti-
tled to occupancy shall be persons or families of low income-those whose probable ag-
gregate annual income at the time of admission and during the period of occupancy does
not exceed seven times the rental of the dwelling, including the value or cost of heat,
light, water, and cooking fuel. Id. § 31.
The resale price of shares in a mutual company is outlined in § 31:1(a). Basically, the
resale price is equal to the price paid by the selling tenant plus the cost of any capital
improvements plus a portion of the actual aggregate amortization paid on all existing and
prior mortgages plus reasonable administrative costs. This sales price is subject to the
approval of New York's commissioner of housing.
135. The Limited Dividend Housing Companies Law was passed in 1949 to encourage
the investment of the savings of the people in low rent housing accommodations. Id.
§ 70.
136. The Redevelopment Companies Law was passed in 1961 for the clearance, replan-
ning, reconstruction, rehabilitation, and modernization of substandard and insanitary ar-
eas and the provision of adequate, safe, sanitary, and properly planned housing
accommodations. Id. § 101. The provisions for creating a redevelopment company are
located in § 103.
137. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 552 (McKinney 1976).
138. Article XI, the Housing Development Fund Company Law, was added to the
PHFL in 1966 in response to the emergence of community-based, nonprofit corporations
in that era. Id. §§ 573-582. Such corporations are eligible for certain state "seed-fund"
grants and loans, and are allowed 100% tax abatement for their projects, as compared to
Mitchell-Lama companies, which must pay at least 10% of rent in property taxes. Id.
§ 575 (McKinney Supp. 1990). Operating grants for certain community-based nonprofits
were authorized under art. XVI, the Neighborhood Preservation Companies Act,
adopted in 1977, and under art. XVII, the Housing and Community Preservation in Ru-
ral Areas Act, adopted in 1980. Id. § 1001-10 (McKinney Supp. 1989).
139. Id. §§ 1100-03, 1110-13.
140. The Low Income Housing Trust Fund Program defined "low-income" persons to
be benefitted as those having incomes which do not exceed 80% of the applicable median
income. Id. § 1002(6).
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a separate corporation administered by the State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal,141 and the Affordable Home Ownership
Development Program,142 operated by a separate corporation admin-
istered by the State Housing Finance Agency.143 These programs
make available substantial grant funds to Article XI Housing Devel-
opment Fund Companies, to other qualifying nonprofit corporations,
and to local governments for the purpose of rehabilitating and con-
structing housing for low and moderate income persons and house-
holds.' 44 This expansive and diverse set of statutes broadly authorize
local governments to assist the housing projects of companies created
or financed under the PHFL.
A variety of provisions of the PHFL enable local governments to
make housing projects advanced by the Limited Profit Housing Coin-
pantes (Article II companies) and Housing Development Fund Com-
panies (Article XI companies) more affordable.' 45 Within certain
limits, 4 6 these authorities parallel the powers given to local govern-
ments to assist projects developed by Municipal Housing Agencies.147
These powers are far reaching. They permit municipalities to act di-
rectly to create affordable housing. They include abating local
taxes,'48 mortgage financing, 149 acquisition and disposition of prop-
141. See Id. § 1101.
142. The Affordable Home Ownership Program continues the PHFL tradition of de-
fining occupant eligibility in reference to the ability of households to procure housing in
the private market. Id. § 1110.
143. Id. § 1112.
144. Id. § 1112(1).
145. See infra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
14.7. See supra notes 119-30.
148. Sections 33 and 577 of the PHFL authorize local governments to abate real prop-
erty taxes, including those of the school district and county, for qualified projects of art.
II and art. XI companies. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 33, 577 (McKinney 1976 &
Supp. 1990). In the case of an art. II company under § 33, the abatement is partial. Such
projects must pay at least "[10%] of the annual shelter rent or carrying charges." In
calculating "shelter rent," payments for utilities are excluded. Section 577 authorizes
local governments to abate 100% of the property taxes for a qualified project of an art.
XI Housing Development Fund company for a period of up to 40 years. Under this
statute, mortgages of Housing Development Fund companies are exempt from mortgage
recording taxes imposed by art. 11 of the Tax Law. Id. § 577. The state comptroller has
ruled that § 577 does not exempt Housing development fund companies from administra-
tive fees charged by local governments in the course of regulating the development and
operation of housing projects. 34 Op. State Compt. 102 (1978).
149. The Private Housing Finance Law authorizes cities, towns and villages to issue
bonds to provide mortgage financing directly to a project of an art. II, limited profit
housing company. N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW §§ 23, 23-a (McKinney 1976 & Supp.
1990). This authority extends to projects of nonprofit organizations created under art. II
for the purpose of housing for aged or handicapped persons of low income or other per-
sons of low income. See id. §§ 23 (1), 12, 14. The funding for such mortgages is obtained
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erty,15 ° direct municipal subsidies, and provision of infrastructure."'5
In addition to these general powers, "special" powers address specific
by the issuance of full faith and credit bonds by the locality. Id. § 23. In the case of an
art. II company organized by a private developer, the § 23 mortgage can equal 95% of
the project's cost. In the case of a not-for-profit corporation organized under art. II, the
mortgage can equal 100% of such costs.
Section 23 allows municipalities to support eligible projects in two critical ways. First,
it makes financing available for such projects that may not otherwise exist in the private
market. Second, the cost of such a mortgage can be considerably less than that of private
mortgages. Id. Since the bonds are favorably rated, full faith and credit municipal
bonds, they will carry an interest rate that is substantially less than prevailing rates for
long-term housing mortgages. Section 23 authorizes such mortgages to"contain such
terms and conditions ... as the local legislative body may deem necessary or desirable to
secure repayment of its loan, the interest thereon and other charges in connection there-
with." Id. § 23(1).
150. Article IX of the Private Housing Finance Law states that "real property may be
acquired by a housing company, a limited-profit housing company or by a municipality
for a housing company or a limited-profit housing company, by gift, grant, devise,
purchase, condemnation or otherwise." Id. § 500. This provision contains no authority
to reduce the cost of property conveyed to an eligible company, but it does provide criti-
cal authority to secure property directly on behalf of such companies. Id. A special
procedure for municipal condemnation, on request of such a company, is contained in
art. IX. Section 501 of the Private Housing Finance Law contains the following author-
ity: A housing company may petition a municipality to institute condemnation proceed-
ings to acquire property for the development of low income housing. The housing
company shall pay the municipality an amount designated by the municipality, or the
sum expended by the municipality in the acquisition'of the property. The amount, time
and manner of payment shall be set forth in a resolution passed by the local legislative
body. Once the resolution is passed, the municipality may proceed in accordance with
the procedures of eminent domain. When the title to the property vests in the municipal-
ity, title shall be conveyed to the housing company, enabling the housing company to
enter the property and proceed with its development.
Section 503 of art. IX authorizes local governments to sell or lease excess publicly-held
property to qualified housing companies, including art. II companies. Id. § 503. Such a
conveyance can be made without appraisal, public notice or bidding "for such price or
rental and upon such terms... as may be agreed upon between the municipality and the
housing company." Id. § 503(2). A public hearing is required prior to such a convey-
ance. Id. § 503(3).
Section 576-a of art. XI makes it clear that this authority to acquire land and to sell
excess lands also extends to art. XI housing development fund companies. Id. § 576-a.
This section allows local governments to convey publicly-held real property to an art. XI
company without public auction, upon public notice and hearing. Id.
151. In the area of providing direct subsidies and infrastructure, however, municipal
authority to assist PHFL projects is significantly less than it is in the public housing
arena. The projects of MHAs, as discussed above, may be assisted with the provision of
infrastructure and the payment of direct operating subsidies. No such blanket authority
is found in regard to PHFL projects.
Under the ordinary operations of its capital budget program, a local government can
install qualified public infrastructure supporting an affordable housing project. Local
government may do this to support any development, if it follows proper statutory proce-
dures. There is no legal impediment to providing off-site public infrastructure to support
and encourage the development of affordable housing; a locality, however, may provide
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concerns such as the construction of housing for the elderly 52 and
emergency shelters.5 3
Municipalities in New York have considerable authority to reduce
the cost of housing projects to accommodate those who cannot afford
private market housing.5 4 Enterprising local officials may combine
these cost reduction techniques with the zoning powers discussed in
Part II. When these powers are combined creatively, it is easy to dis-
pel the myth of municipal impotence in the housing field. The diffi-
culty, however, of mastering this amalgam of statutory authorities
and the cases and legal principles that shape them may prevent locali-
ties from using the authority they already have. Consequently, until
on-site infrastructure, which is normally paid for by the private developer, only to a pub-
lic housing project.
Municipalities possess the authority to act more potently in assisting senior citizen
housing, whether or not the projects are sponsored by a municipal housing authority.
Section 290 of the General Municipal Law authorizes a city, town or village "to establish,
construct, equip, maintain and operate for such city, town or village, a facility for housing
... the elderly citizens of the community .... N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 290 (McKin-
ney 1986).
152. Section 291 further authorizes the use of "real property owned by the county,
town, city or village" for such senior citizen projects, as long as the property is not
needed for other public use. Id. § 291. In addition, § 291 authorizes the appropriation of
public funds to acquire real property for such projects by negotiation or condemnation.
Section 291 also permits this authority to be used for land banking of real property for
future projects. Id. Land banking is the acquisition by a municipality of undeveloped
land, the holding of that land, and the later disposition of it at a below market price to a
public, not-for-profit, or private developer for the development of affordable housing. See
H. FLECHNER, LAND BANKING IN THE CONTROL OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 3-9
(1973).
Although §§ 290 and 291 do not say so explicitly, local governments may authorize
non-profit and other regulated companies to carry out such functions as they are author-
ized to do directly. See 58 Op. N.Y. Compt. 861 (1958) (county governments may con-
tract to have governmental services performed as the county could have directly
performed itself). It would seem possible, then, for a local government to work with and
through an art. II or art. XI company to develop a housing facility for "elderly citizens of
the community" under these provisions. This would allow the locality to pay any costs of
establishing, constructing, equipping, maintaining, or operating such a project that are
not covered by the rents or payments of the occupants. When working to assist the
development of senior housing, the locality should proceed directly under § 290, particu-
larly in light of the comptroller's opinion stating that a town does not have the power to
donate funds to a private organization that intends to build a senior citizens' housing
project. 78 Op. N.Y. Compt. 338 (1978).
153. Section 576-c of the PHFL authorizes cities, towns and villages to make loans to
an art. XI company in order to acquire, rehabilitate or construct housing exclusively for
persons and families of low income who reside in or need emergency shelter as defined by
the municipality. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. LAW § 576-c (Supp. 1990). These loans may be
converted to grants if the property is owned and operated for such purposes over a 15
year period. Id. This provision was added to the PHFL in 1987 in response to the public
emergency created by the dramatic increase in homelessness throughout the state.
154. See supra notes 110-53 and accompanying text.
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the state acts to make the law of affordable housing less cumbersome,
and to provide municipalities with more guidance, its use will be lim-
ited to those communities graced with resourceful officials and
advisers. 55
IV. Conclusion
In assessing the virtues of local authority as a guard against the
evils of despotism in America, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:
a democracy without provincial institutions has no security
against these evils. How can a populace, unaccustomed to freedom
in small concerns, learn to use it temperately in great affairs? ....
Those who... fear absolute power, ought.., to desire the gradual
development of provincial liberties. '56
Today, localities sit in close proximity, not in relative isolation as they
did in de Tocqueville's time.'57 Land use experts, therefore, question
local governments' effectiveness in regulating development in contem-
porary metropolitan areas. A commentator on municipal law has
noted that recent cases "exemplify a growing consensus among the
courts of this [s]tate to broadly construe the 'statewide concern' doc-
trine . . . in order to severely curtail municipal home rule
authority."'5 s
155. For an example of such resourcefulness, see supra at page 383 for the author's
dedication of this Article to the pioneering work of a handful of communities in the state.
156. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 46 (Washington Square Press
ed. 1964) (1835-40). In addition, de Tocqueville wrote:
[i]n the American townships, power has been disseminated with admirable skill,
for the purpose of interesting the greatest possible number of persons in the
common weal .... The American system, which divides the local authority
among so many citizens, does not scruple to multiply the functions of the town
officers .... In this manner, the activity of the township is continually percepti-
ble; it is daily manifested in the fulfillment of a duty, or the exercise of a right;
and a constant though gentle motion is thus kept up in society, which animates
without disturbing it.
Id. at 40.
157. See supra note 12, citing recent New York Court of Appeals decisions which call
for "sound regional planning" and "[s]tate-wide or regional control of planning" to in-
sure that "interests broader than that of the municipality underlie various land use
policies."
158. Sweeney, Courts Strike Down Impact Fee Laws, 3 MUN. LAW. 1, 4 (1988) (joint
publication of the Municipal Law Section of the New York State Bar Association and the
Edwin G. Michaelian Municipal Law Resource Center of Pace University). "It is appar-
ent to this author that our [c]ourts are viewing the municipalities as little more than
agencies of state government. Due to the ever shrinking geo-political world of the state
... almost everything is a matter of statewide concern precluding its control by the
municipalities." Id.; see also Cole,'Constitutional Home Rule in New York; The Ghost of
Home Rule, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713 (1984-85).
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If solving the "crisis"' 59 in affordable housing is a matter of state-
wide concern, the public should expect much more clarity from state
officials in articulating solutions. Sixty years of law-making has re-
sulted in a complex accretion of statutes and judicial decisions. Some
courts appear to have misunderstood the extent of local authority, 160
and some have called for the state legislature to provide direct gui-
dance to local government.' 6' The legislature has thoroughly ignored
those pleas. As the housing crisis steadily worsens, it is time for the
legislature to reconsider its housing policies and for the courts to reex-
amine what authority is within the grasp of local officials. Although
local governments have the power to create affordable housing, the
state could provide valuable assistance to help them implement their
broad powers.
The options available to the state in assisting or directing local gov-
ernments to solve the housing crisis include: (1) endorsing de Toc-
queville's view and supporting local government by providing
unambiguous authority and competent technical assistance and other
resources; 62 (2) defining regional housing needs and directing locali-
ties to meet a stated percentage of those needs, under penalty of court
ordered rezoning, as New Jersey has done; 163 and (3) articulating a
159. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 12.
162. If it is to follow this path, the state should examine its housing statutes, which do
not constitute a well organized body of municipal authority to act to create, or assist in
the creation of, affordable housing. Instead of providing a clear and easily applied
blueprint to localities, they are organized by category of housing developer, by income of
occupant, by geographical area, or by type of assistance. At a minimum, an article
enumerating municipal powers could be added to the Private Housing Finance Law or
the General Municipal Law so that local officials and their attorneys could rely on a
codification of modem authority to act to solve this critical, state-wide problem.
163. The Supreme Court of New Jersey provided this direction: a developing munici-
pality "must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an
appropriate variety and choice of housing" for low- and moderate-income households.
The municipality must, therefore, "afford such persons the opportunity to acquire such
housing at least to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospec-
tive regional need therefor." Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 188, 336 A.2d 713, 731-32 (1975). The New Jersey court's
opinion in the later Mount Laurel II decision, supra notes 10, 18-19, represents a knowl-
edgeable tour-de-force of housing programming. The court commented that higher den-
sity zoning, without conditions, seldom produces affordable lower income housing, 92
N.J. 158, 261, 456 A.2d 390, 443 (1983); it sanctioned rent and resale controls to keep
housing affordable, id. at 269, 456 A.2d at 447; it mandated that zoning ordinances be
amended to remove cost generating restrictions and to include density bonuses or allow
mobile home construction, id. at 267-77, 456 A.2d at 446-51; and it cast the net broadly
stating "where appropriate, municipalities should provide a realistic opportunity for
housing through other municipal action inextricably related to land regulations," id. at
264, 456 A.2d at 444 (referring presumably to awarding tax abatement, donating publicly
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state developmental policy, as Oregon has done, defining the extent of
local responsibility to implement that policy, and directing state agen-
cies to act so that housing is produced in the quantities and locations
necessary to accomplish the objectives of that policy.' 64
Unlike Oregon and New Jersey, neither the New York State legisla-
ture nor any state agency has articulated a statewide housing policy,
defined regional housing needs, or allocated responsibility to individ-
ual municipalities. The state has failed to explain to localities the ef-
fective use of existing authority, failed to modernize and codify that
authority so it is understandable, and failed to provide effective tech-
nical assistance to local governments. The courts have determined
that they "will assess the reasonableness of what the locality has
done '  in light of present and foreseeable local and regional housing
needs, to be proved anew in each case brought to bar.'66
Apparently, the policy of the State of New York is to leave the
problem of housing the poor in the hands of relatively untutored local
officials who lack the advantages of clearly defined responsibilities,
meaningful guidance and competent technical assistance. The courts
and these officials must come to understand, as apparently they do
not,16 7 that local governments possess the authority to facilitate the
creation of housing affordable to a broad spectrum of the state's popu-
lation. In addition, the courts must begin to focus on localities' re-
owned land, and using other authorities, such as those possessed by New York munici-
palities under the Public Housing Law and Private Housing Finance Law detailed supra
at (Part III)).
164. In Oregon, the state legislature provided a structure for statewide land use plan-
ning that includes housing as one of 14 statewide goals that must be accommodated in
local planning and zoning decisions. A state agency was created to function as the over-
seer of the comprehensive planning process at the local level and to assure that local plans
are in compliance with statewide goals. That agency adopted a statewide housing goal in
1975 which states that:
[b]uildable lands for residential use shall be inventoried and plans shall en-
courage the availability of adequate numbers of housing units at price ranges
and rent levels which are commensurate with the financial capabilities of Ore-
gon households and allow for flexibility of housing location, type and density.
OR. ADMIN. R. ch. 660, § 15-000(10) (1985). The legislative response to the housing cost
problems in Oregon includes legislation to require state agencies to use an expedited per-
mit procedure for processing housing applications, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 447.800-.865
(1977 Rep. Pt.), and a requirement that the cost of all state and local regulatory legisla-
tion should be measured against the benefits to the occupants, see 1977 OR. LAWS, RESO-
LUTIONS, HJR8, at 1094-95.
165. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 111', 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672, 682 (1975); see also supra note 10.
166. On the difficulties involved with such proof in the absence of some articulated
methodology or policy at the state level, see generally Raymond, Berenson: An Obliga-
tion Undefined is An Obligation Unfulfilled, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 131 (1986).
167. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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sponsibilities to correct existing exclusionary zoning policies. Equally
important, state officials must integrate and communicate the author-
ity contained in the Public Housing Law and the Private Housing
Finance Law, if they expect local officials to solve the housing crisis
proclaimed by the Governor's Task Force.
